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Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a 
Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Damage 
The relationship between the warranty provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code1 and strict tort liability for physical harm2 caused 
by a defective product has been the source of considerable contro-
versy. 3 Virtually all states allow the buyer of a defective product a 
cause of action based on both theories. 4 The theoretical justifications 
for the tort remedy, however, are different from those supporting the 
essentially contractual5 warranty remedy.6 While the remedies over-
lap significantly, they are not coextensive.7 Establishing the boundary 
between them has proved very difficult. 8 
One important aspect of this boundary-drawing process is deter-
1. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-318 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (limitation of warranty to 
exclude personal injuries is prima facie unconscionable in the case of consumer goods); U.C.C. 
§ 2-302 (unconscionability generally). 
2. Physical harm includes personal injuries and property damage. See REsrATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 7(3) (1965) (defining physical harm); see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 
Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965) (strict tort liability includes physical 
injury to property as well as personal injury). 
3. See, e.g., Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doc-
trines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 
RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970); Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing 
Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1983); Note, Economic Loss in 
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Eco-
nomic Loss]; Note, Products Liability in Commercial Transactions, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1061 
(1976); Note, Torts- Products Lfability- Should Contract or Tort Provide the Cause of Action 
Wizen a Plaintiff Seeks Recovery Only for Damage to the Product Itself, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 489 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Contract or Tort]. 
4. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C. The Delaware 
Supreme Court has held that the state legislature's adoption of the U.C.C. preempted judicial 
adoption of strict tort liability. Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 975 (Del. 1980). The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has reached a similar result. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 
375 Mass. 633, 640, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 
628, 629, 378 N.E.2d 61, 62 (1978) (breach of warranty under Massachusetts U.C.C. provides as 
comprehensive a remedy as strict tort liability). See generally 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMER-
ICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 4:41 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1985). 
5. See Part II. A infra. 
6. Contract Jaw rests on obligations imposed by the parties to the contract. It seeks to put 
the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the defendant fully performed. See 
U.C.C. § 1-106 (1978). Tort law rests on obligations imposed by law. It seeks to restore the 
plaintiff to the position he or she was in before being injured by the defendant's wrongful con-
duct. See Wade, supra note 3, at 24; see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussed in text at notes 18-21 infra). 
7. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 325 (2d ed. 1980). 
8. See Wade, supra note 3, at 26 n.87; see also W. Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and 
Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1953); cf. G. GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
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mining which items of damages are recoverable under which theory.9 
In particular, economic losses - e.g., damages for inadequate value, 
costs of repair, and replacement of defective goods, or for consequent 
loss of profits10 - generally cannot be recovered in a tort action. 11 
These losses represent the buyer's contractual expectation interest, and 
the buyer's remedy, if any, must be based on the product's warranty. 12 
Tort and contract principles come into conflict when the product 
itself is damaged or destroyed as the result of its own defect. 13 The 
product is the buyer's property, and damages for physical harm to 
property are recoverable in tort. 14 However, the value of the product 
itself is the central element in the parties' bargain. As part of that 
bargain, the parties may have allocated the risks of a defect. The 
premises of contract law are abandoned if a buyer may evade contrac-
tual language excluding or limiting warranty liability simply by suing 
the seller in tort.1s 
This Note argues that if a seller and a commercial buyer are in 
privity, damage to a product resulting from its own defect should not 
be recoverable by a commercial buyer in a tort action. Part I shows 
9. See, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 983 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Mid Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978). 
10. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 405; Note, Economic Loss, supra note 3, at 
917. Various definitions of economic loss have been applied by courts and commentators. See 
generally Note, Products Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic 
Loss Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 963, 963 n.2 (1978). 
11. The leading case espousing this view is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 
145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Contra Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 
305 (1965). See generally Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of''Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. 
REv. 29, 40 (1976); Note, Manufacturer's Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic Loss, 
41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401, 405 (1967). 
12. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d 
Cir. 1980); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Southwest 
Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 
(1970); Plainwell Paper Co. v. Pram, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1386 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Arizona v. Cook 
Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975), affd., 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 
17 (1965); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); National 
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Mid Continent Air-
craft v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978). 
13. See Wade, supra note 3, at 26 n.87. 
14. See note 2 supra; see also Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 
317 Pa. Super. 65, 80, 463 A.2d 1085, 1093 (1983) (Hester, J., dissenting); Air Prods. & Chems. 
v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 217-19, 206 N.W.2d 414, 426-28 (1973). 
15. Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 984 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e 
do not believe that a sophisticated, commercial buyer ... can evade contractual language exclud-
ing liability for consequential or special damages simply by suing the seller in tort."); see also 
Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741F.2d1569, 1582 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The extension of prod-
ucts liability to these types of losses would make the manufacturer the guarantor that its prod· 
ucts would continue to perform satisfactory [sic] throughout their productive lives. This is 
plainly against the purpose of either current manufacturer's products liability or contract law."); 
Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1984) ("To allow tort 
remedies to overlay this commercial framework ... would undermine certainty and predictabil-
ity in business relationships .... "). 
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how the conflict arises and examines the judicial boundaries that are 
normally drawn between tort and warranty liability. Part II contrasts 
the rationales for the warranty and tort remedies, with particular em-
phasis on the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. Part III argues that if a seller and a 
commercial buyer are in privity and the only damage is to the defec-
tive product itself, the rationales supporting strict tort liability are in-
applicable. The Note concludes that commercial buyers seeking to 
recover the value of a product that has been damaged as a result of its 
own defect should be limited to the remedies provided by the Uniform 
Commercial Code in a suit against their immediate sellers. 
I. PHYSICAL DAMAGE AND THE ECONOMIC-Loss RULE 
The buyer of a defective product can always seek a remedy under 
the Uniform Commercial Code. If some provision of the Code bars or 
limits recovery, 16 the buyer may seek to circumvent the troublesome 
Code provision by suing under the strict tort liability theory. Ordi-
narily, if there is physical damage to persons or property, the policies 
underlying strict tort liability are sufficiently strong to permit recourse 
to tort law as an alternate theory of recovery. 17 However, if the only 
damage caused by the defective product is to the product itself- that 
is, if the physical damage is self-inflicted - the policies supporting an 
action based on strict tort liability are far less compelling. 
The facts in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. 18 illustrate the conflict between the Uniform Commercial Code 
warranty provisions and strict tort liability. Pennsylvania Glass Sand 
(PGS) bought a front-end loader from Caterpillar in 1971. The ex-
press warranty accompanying the loader limited the purchaser's rem-
edy to replacement of defective parts and specifically excluded 
recovery for economic loss. 19 For approximately four years, PGS used 
the loader daily at its quarry in Mapleton, Pennsylvania. In Septem-
ber 1975 a fire broke out near the loader's hydraulic lines. The opera-
tor escaped injury, but neglected to turn the machine off. As a result, 
hydraulic fluid continued to fuel the fire, causing severe damage to the 
loader. 
In June 1979 PGS filed suit seeking as damages the amount spent 
on repairing the loader and securing a temporary replacement. Liabil-
ity for these damages was specifically excluded by Caterpillar's war-
16. See notes 55.59 infra and accompanying text. 
17. E.g., Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (noting in 
dicta: "Imposing tort liability on a manufacturer ... is justified when a product causes personal 
injury or even when it causes damage to itself or other property under circumstances in which 
the absence of personal injury is merely fortuitous .... "), affd., 771F.2d1081 (7th Cir. 1985). 
18. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
19. 652 F.2d at 1167. 
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ranty. Moreover, as the court noted, by the time suit was filed, a 
warranty claim was probably barred by the Code's statute of limita-
tions. 20 Nevertheless, by advancing theories of negligence and strict 
tort liability, PGS was able to proceed to tria1.21 
Because of the existence of both tort and contract remedies for per-
sonal injuries and property damage, courts face a "seamless web run-
ning from express warranty through the implied warranty of 
merchantability to strict tort liability."22 The tort theory offers an im-
portant advantage to buyers because, in a tort action, the various Code 
defenses23 are not available to the seller. Since the issue of liability and 
the amount of recovery may depend on which theory is successful, 
courts entertaining both theories in a single suit have been forced to 
define the contours of the developing tort remedy.24 
It is generally accepted that economic losses,25 at least when unac-
companied by any physical damage,26 are not recoverable in an action 
based on strict tort liability.27 The rationale for this rule is that the 
buyer's economic interests are adequately protected by the Code, 28 
and subjecting a seller to strict liability for exclusively economic losses 
would displace the legislatively enacted Code framework.29 Moreover, 
imposing tort liability would result in "the consuming public [paying] 
more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the 
possibility that some of his products will not meet the business needs 
of some of his customers."30 
In many situations, the economic-loss rule can be applied without 
20. 652 F.2d at 1167 n.2. 
21. 652 F.2d at 1176. 
22. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 325. 
23. See notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169-
73 (3d Cir. 1981) (tracing the development of strict tort liability and the economic-Joss doctrine). 
25. For the purposes of this analysis, economic losses are defined as damages for inadequate 
value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits. See 
note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
26. See note 2 supra. 
27. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). 
But see, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). 
28. See, e.g., Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 
(1978). 
29. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91, 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 
(1982) (commercial buyer limited to U.C.C. remedies for cracks developing in a defective silo). 
30. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 eat: 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 
(1965). 
The mechanism by which a seller can pass these insurance costs on to a buyer is considerably 
more complicated than first appears. Apparently the benchmark cost of insuring against prod-
ucts liability now stands at about one percent of sales, although there are, of course, major varia-
tions among industries. See Schwartz, New Products. Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactfre 
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 812 & n.114 (1983); see also INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT (1978). The one percent fig-
ure does not reflect the cumulative effect of the cost of products liability insurance as the product 
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difficulty. It is reasonably clear that the "operation of a defective radi-
ator causes property damage when it results in a fire which destroys 
the plaintiff's store and economic harm when it results in conditions so 
uncomfortable that it causes the loss of customer patronage."31 Dam-
ages to the store could be recovered in a tort suit, while damages for 
lost profits would be recoverable, if at all, in contract. 32 But if a prod-
uct is damaged as a result of its own defects - if, for example, the 
radiator becomes clogged because of a defective valve - the property 
damage is coextensive with the economic loss. In such cases, the eco-
nomic-loss rule's "type of harm" criterion provides no guidance on 
whether a tort remedy should be available. 
Courts have taken four different approaches to determining 
whether a tort recovery is available for a product's self-inflicted dam-
ages. Two of those approaches simply read the economic-loss rule as 
if it did provide guidance. The fact that economic loss is coincident 
with physical damage does not make it any the less economic loss, and 
one approach is to deny recovery for a defective product's self-inflicted 
damage for that reason. 33 A second approach reaches the opposite 
conclusion by essentially the same logic: the fact that a defective prod-
uct's self-inflicted damage is coincident with economic loss does not 
make it any the less physical damage, or any the less recoverable in a 
tort action.34 Clearly, neither of these approaches provides a princi-
passes through the chain of distribution, nor does it reflect indirect costs borne by the insured, 
such as claims handling and deductibles. Id. at VI-23 to VI-24. 
Depending on a firm's profit margin, it may or may not be able to absorb the cost of insuring 
against products liability, see id. at VI-12 to VI-13, and, depending on the elasticity of demand 
for a firm's products, it may or may not be able to pass these costs on to its buyers. But cf. H. 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 63-64 (1978) (In a competitive market, whether a tax is 
levied on a producer or a consumer makes no difference in the short run; in the long run, the 
price to the consumer will have to rise by exactly the amount of the tax.). 
31. Note, Economic Loss, supra note 3, at 918. 
32. But see, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fisher-
men allowed to recover for economic losses resulting from an oil spill caused by oil company's 
negligence). 
33. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Steeple Jae Inc., 352 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (damage to a window washing unit resulting from a fall caused by the unit's own 
defective gear box not recoverable under negligence or strict tort liability theories, even when the 
defect creates an unreasonable danger to persons or other property); Mid Continent Aircraft v. 
Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (fex. 1978) (no tort recovery for buyer of a rebuilt 
airplane, damaged in a forced landing after its engine failed, when there were no personal injuries 
or damages to property other than the airplane itself). 
34. The leading case espousing this approach is Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Cases in other jurisdictions adopting the Santor approach include 
Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355, 363-66 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (allowing 
commercial buyer to recover under strict liability in tort for direct and indirect economic losses 
due to defective steam turbine); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 608-09, 
182 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970) (allowing owners of golf course to recover against manufacturer in 
strict liability for economic losses resulting from defects in golf carts); Iacono v. Anderson Con-
crete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 91-93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 269-71 (1975) (allowing homeowner to 
maintain an action in tort for damage to concrete driveway due to defective materials and work-
manship); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, 72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1976) 
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pled basis for allowing or disallowing recovery for self-inflicted 
damages. 
Not surprisingly, a majority of courts have turned to a third ap-
proach, based upon the landmark decision of Seely v. White Motor 
Co. 35 The Seely court reasoned that a requirement for the imposition 
of strict tort liability is the existence of an unreasonably dangerous 
defect, so that only contractual remedies should be available for ordi-
nary qualitative defects. 36 Thus, when the damage to the defective 
product results from deterioration or some other gradual, nonacciden-
tal cause, it is characterized as economic loss, and any remedies must 
be found in the Code. 37 When a product defect causes the product to 
sustain physical harm in a violent or sudden manner, the damage is 
characterized as property damage, and the manufacturer also will be 
liable in tort.38 The rationale is that when a product defect creates a 
risk of personal injury, liability should not depend upon the fortuity of 
whether or not personal injuries actually occurred. 39 
(permitting tort recovery from manufacturer of defective roofing materials for loss of value of 
roof and, in dicta, also for consequential economic damages). In Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
Santor holding did not extend to commercial buyers. The plaintiff, a distributor in the business 
of selling and leasing trucks, was thus limited to its Code remedies. 
35. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). 
36. [The manufacturer] can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by 
defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions 
that create unreasonabfe risks of harm .... [The consumer] can ... be fairly charged with 
the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer 
agrees that it will. 
63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. In Seely, the plaintiff bought a truck from 
the defendant, White Motor Company. Upon taking possession of the truck, the buyer found 
that it bounced violently, a condition known as "galloping." The seller's representatives made 
many unsuccessful efforts to correct the problem. Later, faulty brakes caused the buyer's truck 
to overturn, resulting in damage to the truck but no personal injuries. The buyer sued the seller 
for (1) accident-related damages for the repair of the truck, and (2) damages, unrelated to the 
accident, for the money paid on the purchase price and for the profits lost in his business because 
he was unable to make normal use of the truck. The California Supreme Court affirmed a judg-
ment awarding the plaintiff the second category of damages based on breach of warranty, but 
denying the plaintiff's strict tort liability claim for the accident-related damages. 
37. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1977) (disallowing action 
based on strict tort liability against a mobile home manufacturer to recover damages for defects 
such as a faulty furnace, doors that would not close, cracked windows, a malfunctioning electri-
cal system, a leaky bathtub, and a leaky roof, because the defects resulted only in economic 
losses). 
38. See Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977) (allowing action based on strict 
tort liability against a mobile home manufacturer for damages to the mobile home resulting from 
a fire caused by the product's own defect). 
39. See Largoza v. General Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("It would 
surely be anomalous if manufacturers were allowed to evade their responsibility to market safe 
products merely because of the fortuitous circumstances that loss of life did not result on a 
particular occasion."); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 22 n.2, 403 P.2d 145, 154 n.2, 45 
Cal. Rptr. 17, 26 n.2 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring) ("I cannot rationally hold that the plaintiff 
whose vehicle is destroyed in an accident caused by a defective part may recover his property 
damage under a given theory while another plaintiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover 
the defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other damages proximately 
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The Seely approach provides a principled basis for delineating the 
limits of the economic-loss rule by refining the "type of harm" con-
cept. In practice, however, this means that courts must make their 
own assessments of the sort of risks that may have been posed by par-
ticular defects. Moreover, the Seely approach allows contractual ar-
rangements to be upset depending on how suddenly an economic loss 
is incurred.40 A fourth approach obviates both speculation and fortu-
ity by returning to a fundamental distinction: Contract law, unlike 
tort law, is predicated on a bargain between two parties.41 If the risk 
which in fact materialized was the subject of contractual risk alloca-
tion,42 using tort law to shift losses subverts the rationale for the eco-
nomic-loss rule. Under this approach, the key factor is whether the 
buyer and seller were in privity,43 and thus in a position to allocate the 
risks of self-inflicted damage to defective products. 44 If they were, tort 
caused by an identical defective part. The strict liability should apply to both plaintiffs or to 
neither. They cannot be validly distinguished."); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely 
Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 
145, 154 (1972); cf Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 
1173 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing inter-
related factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the 
injury arose."). 
40. See Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093, 1102 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Weis, J., dissenting): 
[E]conomic loss, including damage to the product itself, is a matter for negotiation and 
allocation of risk between the parties. The fortuity that personal injury or outside property 
damage might occur in addition to injury to the defective product does not require a differ-
ent rule with respect to economic loss. 
41. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 26, 403 P.2d 145, 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 28 
(1965) (Peters, J., concurring) ("How can the nature of the damages which occur later, long after 
the transaction has been completed, control the characterization of the transaction? Any line 
which determines whether damages should be covered by warranty law or the strict liability 
doctrine should be drawn at the time the sale is made.") (emphasis in original). 
42. In Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1986), the 
court upheld a tort recovery for the value of an engine that exploded due to a faulty replacement 
part, in part because "no limitation of liability had been agreed to by the partie5. They did not 
shift the economic risk of an accident by agreement from what the parties could expect under 
ordinary tort principles." 780 F.2d at 1099. That the parties are entitled to limit liability by 
mutual agreement, however, demonstrates that their relationship is essentially contractual. It 
cannot be that the question of whether the U.C.C. applies, to the exclusion of strict tort liability, 
depends upon whether the parties have agreed to an express limitation of liability. Cf note 44 
infra. 
43. Originally, lack of privity was grounds for dismissing a tort claim. See note 66 infra. 
This new approach thus stands the old privity limitation on its head, by requiring dismissal of 
tort claims if the parties are in privity. 
44. Whether genuine bargaining can occur also depends, of course, on the relative strength of 
the parties. Some courts have held strict tort liability inapplicable between parties who "(1) deal 
in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the 
specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it." 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 
845 (1976); see also Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979). This Note 
argues that, although the consumer/commercial buyer distinction is problematic, see note 144 
infra, the privity approach is properly limited to disputes involving commercial buyers. 
Demanding evidence of actual negotiation about loss due to product defects - rather than 
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remedies are unavailable, regardless of the way the damage 
occurred. 45 
The economic-loss rule does not itself provide an answer to the 
problem of a product's self-inflicted damage. The inconsistent results 
it has yielded in federal court diversity cases, where a buyer's recovery 
may depend on complicated choice-of-law questions and tenuous pre-
dictions of state law, highlight the need for a workable and uniform 
rule.46 In cases involving commercial buyers, such a rule can be devel-
oped from an analysis of the different policies underlying strict tort 
liability and the Uniform Commercial Code. 
II. WARRANTY AND STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PARALLEL THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
The justifications for strict liability in tort are distinct from the 
policies underlying the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code relies 
on market processes to reach a socially desirable outcome. It defers to 
the intentions of the parties because it presumes that they have ade-
quate information and sufficient bargaining power to reach an agree-
ment that advances the interests of the buyer, the seller, and society at 
large. In contrast, strict liability in tort contemplates a failure of mar-
ket processes. Losses are allocated by rule of law because transaction 
costs, information costs, or external costs prevent the parties from 
reaching a socially desirable outcome. 
simply the ability to bargain - is question-begging, for the issue is whether a nonconsensual tort 
remedy should be imposed upon the parties. See notes 88-93 infra and accompanying text. If 
both parties have effective bargaining power, and do not use it to negotiate about risk ofloss, they 
have chosen to avail themselves of the law that will apply in default of a contractual provision. 
What that law is should not vary depending on whether negotiation occurred. 
45. E.g., Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractors, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (deny-
ing negligence and strict tort liability claims against manufacturer of allegedly defective transmis-
sions where plaintiff tractor manufacturer was not a consumer or ultimate user, and the parties 
were in privity); General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (plaintiffs, owners and operators of Three Mile Island nuclear generating facility denied 
strict tort liability claim against manufacturer of allegedly defective nuclear steam supply system 
where, inter alia, the parties were in contractual privity and were in a position to allocate risk). 
46. See Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984): 
This appeal demonstrates the problems faced in diversity cases when federal courts must 
predict state Jaw without the security of appellate review by the st;ite's highest court. The 
problem is particularly acute here, given the dearth of authority in Kentucky law on some of 
the issues, and the considerable variation in the treatment of like issues by the courts of 
different states. 
See also C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (emphasis 
in original): 
[T]he Court is not unmindful of the ... [seller's] forceful policy arguments in refusing to 
recognize a cause of action in tort. However, at this juncture, the superseding policy of 
uniform application of the law compels only one result. Were this court to grant the def en· 
dant's motion, it would result in declaring the same defendant for the same conduct not 
liable in half of this Commonwealth, and liable in the other half. 
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Courts,47 commentators,48 and draftsmen49 have emphasized that 
the tort and Code remedies, like the theories underlying them, are dis-
tinct. Both schemes advance social interests only to the extent that 
their underlying assumptions are valid. Which damages are available 
thus depends upon whether the assumptions underlying the Code or 
those underlying strict tort liability are more likely to hold true when 
a product is damaged as a result of its own defect. 
A. Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
A buyer's action for breach of warranty is governed generally by 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Three of the Code's four warranty 
provisions are relevant to cases involving defective products. so The 
Code controls express warranties, which are created by the parties as 
part of their bargain.51 It also creates an implied warranty of 
merchantability52 and, under certain circumstances, an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 53 
The Code's damage provisions are broad enough to provide relief 
for all injuries to person or property caused by a defective product, 
including damage to the product itself.54 Nevertheless, a buyer at-
tempting to recover under these Code provisions still faces significant 
obstacles. First, a seller may limit the remedies available for breach of 
47. See, e.g., C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Ky. 1981) 
(noting that the "elements of a cause of action in tort for property damage loss differ from the 
elements in contract"); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 17, 21 (1965) ("The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was 
designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the ... Uniform Commercial Code but, 
rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries."). 
48. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 3, at 24-26. 
49. See u.c.c. § 2-318 comment 3 (1978); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
comment m (1964). 
50. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 325-74. The provision relating 
to warranty of title, U.C.C. § 2-312 (1978), is not germane in products liability cases. 
51. u.c.c. § 2-313 {1978). 
52. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). Section 2-314(3) also provides that "other implied warranties 
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." 
53. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978) provides: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for 
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under [2-316] an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
54. See Wade, supra note 3, at 2. Although U.C.C. § 2-714(2) states that the measure of 
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the 
value of the goods as accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, 
U.C.C. § 2-714 comment 3 (1978) states that§ 2-714(2) "describes the usual, standard and rea-
sonable method of ascertaining damages in the case of breach of warranty but it is not intended 
as an exclusive measure." Section 2-714(3) provides that "[i]n a proper case ... consequential 
damages may also be recovered." Section 2-715(2) states that "[c]onsequential damages resulting 
from the seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any 
breach of warranty." Thus, damage to the defective product resulting from its own defect would 
be an element of consequential damages. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 386-87 
&n.54. 
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warranty.ss Second, implied warranties may be disclaimed entirely.56 
Third, the buyer must "within a reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered" a breach of warranty, give notice of the 
breach "or be barred from any remedy."S7 Finally, a breach of war-
ranty normally occurs when tender of delivery is made, ss and an ac-
tion for the breach must be commenced within four years thereafter.s9 
The Uniform Commercial Code, like contract law generally, regu-
lates economic transactions such as buying, selling, leasing, and bor-
rowing. The underlying economic principle is that rational 
decisionmakers will make exchanges that maximize utility.60 In the 
process, resources are allocated to their most valuable uses, thus maxi-
mizing the wealth of society as well. 61 Consistent with the goal of 
facilitating such voluntary exchanges, the underlying policies of the 
Uniform Commercial Code are to simplify, clarify, and modernize the 
law of commercial transactions; permit the continued expansion of 
commercial practices; and encourage uniform commercial laws. 62 
SS. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (1978); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-718 to 2-719 (1978); U.C.C. § 2-719 com· 
ment 3 (1978) ("clauses limiting or excluding consequential damages ... are merely an allocation 
of unknown or undeterminable risks"). 
S6. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) & (3) (1978). A common example of such a disclaimer is the case ofa 
product sold "as is." U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) {1978). See Mid Continent Aircraft v. Curry County 
Spraying Serv., S72 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978). 
S7. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) {1978). See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., S9 Cal. 2d S7, 377 
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (discussing notice requirements under the Uniform Sales Act, 
predecessor of the U.C.C.). 
58. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). An exception is made "where a warranty explicitly extends to 
future performance." See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 92-9S, 
435 N.E.2d 443, 453-54 (1982). 
59. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978). The limitation period for tort claims starts to run only when 
the accident occurs, and thus may extend much longer. See, e.g., Cinnaminson Twp. Bd. of 
Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855, 858-63 (D.N.J. 1982); see also notes 121 & 149 
infra. 
60. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979). 
61. See id. at 2 (footnote omitted): 
If A owns a good that is worth only $100 to him but $150 to B, both will be made better off 
by an exchange of A's good for B's money at any price between $100 and $1SO; and if they 
realize this, they will make the exchange. By making both of them better off, the exchange 
will also increase the wealth of society (of which they are members), assuming the exchange 
does not reduce the welfare ofnonparties more than it increases A's and B's welfare. Before 
the exchange-which, let us say, takes place at a price of $125-A had a good worth $100 
to him and B had $12S in cash, a total of $22S. After the exchange, A has $12S in cash and 
B has a good worth $150 to him, a total of $27S. The exchange has increased the wealth of 
society by $50 (ignoring, as we have done, any possible third-party effects). 
Stated another way, voluntary exchanges enhance economic efficiency. The classic criterion 
for economic efficiency is Pareto superiority, a term that describes an exchange that makes at 
least some people better off without making anyone worse off. Kronman and Posner employ the 
more modem and less stringent Kaldor-Hicks criterion, under which an exchange is efficient if it 
is potentially Pareto superior; i.e., the people who are better off co11ld compensate those who are 
worse off out of their gains. See H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 216 (1978). Bllt see 
Note, Efficiency and a R11le of "Free Contract'': A Critiq11e of Two Models of Law and Eco11om· 
ics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978 (1984). 
62. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(a)-(c) (1978). 
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Freedom of contract is a principle of the Code, 63 and its remedies are 
designed to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other 
party had fully performed the agreement. 64 
B. Strict Tort Liability: Beyond the Warranty Fiction 
The liability of a remote manufacturer in connection with the sale 
of a defective product began to develop early in the twentieth cen-
tury. 65 Under the previous rule, ifthe aggrieved buyer was not in priv-
ity with the manufacturer, no recovery could be had, not even for 
negligence. 66 Once the privity limitation was discarded for negligence, 
however, courts began to carry the manufacturer's responsibility fur-
ther.67 Liability without negligence and without privity was first es-
tablished in cases involving unsafe food and drink. 68 Later, this 
liability was extended to animal food, 69 cosmetics, 70 and other prod-
ucts, 71 eventually resulting in the formulation of the current doctrine 
of strict liability in tort. 12 
Courts relied on a variety oflegal theories to support the extension 
63. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 2 (1978). 
64. u.c.c. § 1-106(1) (1978). 
65. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111N.E.1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). 
66. The privity requirement can be traced to Lord Abinger's broad language in Winterbot-
tom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842), which was taken to mean that the 
original seller of goods was not liable for damages to anyone except his immediate buyer. Today 
the rule seems to be crumbling away, with current vitality primarily in the economic loss cases. 
See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 399-411; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The 
Assault]. 
67. See generally w. PROSSER & w. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 97 (5th ed. 1984). 
68. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913); see also Prosser, The Assault, 
supra note 66, at 1105-06 nn.39-40. Influential in this development was Upton Sinclair's The 
Jungle, which provided a fictional account of abuses in the meat-packing industry. 
69. E.g., McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
70. E.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954). 
71. E.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 
(1958) (cinder block building material). 
72. While strict liability in tort varies from state to state, the most authoritative statement of 
the doctrine is found in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, which provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and • 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller. 
See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 325-26 ("[S]trict tort ... liability is often 
indistinguishable from liability for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability."); id. at 
355: 
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of strict liability.73 The existence of an "implied warranty" became 
the most common ground for decision. 74 The hybrid nature of the 
action for breach of warranty facilitated the adoption of this device.75 
It soon became clear that basing strict liability on a warranty no-
tion created nearly as many problems as it seemed to solve. The term 
was so closely identified with contracts in the minds of most courts 
and lawyers that contract rules were assumed necessarily to apply. 76 
This posed a problem if there was no contract. 77 Also, warranties on 
the sale of goods were governed by the Uniform Sales Act and later, in 
most states, by the Uniform Commercial Code. These statutes were 
intended primarily to govern the contractual relations between the 
seller and an immediate buyer. 78 Notice and disclaimer provisions79 
created formidable obstacles to recovery by a remote buyer. Such a 
buyer is unlikely to have any information about warranty or dis-
claimer terms. 80 Also, it may not occur to a remote buyer to give 
notice to a party with whom the buyer has had no dealings.81 These 
contractual defenses severely curtailed the usefulness of the strict lia-
bility doctrine. 
A concluding question ..• is how the merchantability standard differs from the compa· 
rable strict tort standard .... The most obvious difference between the two standards is that 
the strict tort standard is considerably narrower in scope. It does not purport to reach all 
defective goods but only those that are not only defective but also "unreasonably danger-
ous," that is those that have the capacity to cause personal injury or property damage as 
opposed to those which cause only economic loss. Apart from that difference, we would find 
the terms nearly synonymous .... 
73. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 66, at 1124. 
74. Id. at 1125-26. 
75. "A more notable example oflegal miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which 
produced the modem action for breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising 
out of the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily to be consensual, and 
at the same time came to lie mainly in contract." 
Id. at 1126 (quoting Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 
HARV. L. REv. 414, 414-15 (1929)) (footnotes omitted). 
76. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 66, at 1127. 
77. w. PROSSER & w. KEETON, supra note 67, at 691. 
78. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 78, 435 N.E.2d 443, 447 
(1982). 
79. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. 
80. In a commercial setting, disclaiiners allow the contracting parties to allocate the risks of 
a transaction as they wish. Disclaimers comport well with the general Code policy of allowing 
parties to make their own agreements. See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3 (1978) ("Any seller who 
does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section on contractual 
limitation of remedy[§ 2-719]."); U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 ("[Disclaimers] are merely an allo-
cation of unknown or undeterminable risks."). However, if a manufacturer has disclaimed or 
limited warranties as to the first buyer, e.g., a wholesaler, the ultimate user or consumer may be 
bound by a warranty that he or she has neither seen nor bargained for. See U.C.C. § 2-318 
comment 1. 
81. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) requires a party to give notice of a breach. As between immediate 
parties to a sale this is a sound rule, but as applied to remote parties who have been injured by 
defective products it becomes a "booby-trap for the unwary." See Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (discussing the Uniform Sales Act, 
predecessor of the U.C.C.). 
December 1985] Note - Tort Recovery for Self-Inflicted Damage 529 
Courts resorted to a variety of devices to circumvent the notice and 
disclaimer provisions. 82 This resort to "covert tools"83 caused consid-
erable consternation among legal commentators. 84 As the Reporter 
for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Dean Prosser wrote and urged 
the adoption of section 402A, which extended strict tort liability from 
products "intended for intimate bodily use" to "any product."85 
Shortly before the new Restatement was adopted, the California 
Supreme Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 86 recog-
nizing, for the first time, a general tort theory of strict liability for. 
defective products. Courts were quick to seize upon these develop-
ments as authority for discarding the warranty fiction and for recog-
nizing a new theory of products liability sounding in tort. 87 
82. Courts circumvented notice requirements by holding that a long delay before giving no-
tice was "reasonable," e.g., Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948), that the notice 
provisions did not apply to personal injuries, e.g., Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 
307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956), or that the provision was inapplicable between parties who had not 
dealt with each other, e.g., Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 
416, 184 A.2d 63 (C.P. 1962). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 67, at 691. 
Courts often construed disclaimer provisions away, see, e.g., Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 
S.W.2d 988 (1951), or held that the provisions were not brought home to the buyer, e.g., Wood-
worth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1919), affd., 193 A.D. 971, 184 
N.Y.S. 958 (1920), affd. per curiam, 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922), or simply held them 
invalid as contracts of adhesion or as contrary to public policy, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See generally Prosser, The Assault, supra note 66, 
at 1132. 
83. The phrase "covert tools" was coined by Karl Llewellyn. See Llewellyn, Book Review, 
52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) ("The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpredictabil-
ity, together with inadequate remedy, and evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are 
never reliable tools."). 
84. Karl Llewellyn remarked that: 
[T]he actual need for remedy and reform is tremendous. . . . [T]he legal tools for giving any 
remedy are confused, are uncertain, don't guide trial courts and lead to a welter of appeals 
that is simply outrageous. 
If, for example, you proceed along the lines of warranty, then you run into court after 
court that says, "But a child can't have the remedy." You even run into a court that says, 
"When a wife buys, she buys as the assumed agent of her husband; therefore she has not got 
the remedy." You see, it is nuts, just nuts! 
Wade, supra note 3, at 17-18 (quoting N.C.C.U.S.L., Minutes of the Committee of the Whole 88-
93 (Sept. 1941) (unpublished typescript)). 
Dean Prosser concluded that the use of warranty in these cases was "pernicious and unneces-
sary," because: 
No one doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not 
in contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it is 
"only by some violent pounding and twisting" that "warranty" can be made to serve the 
purpose at all. . . . If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, 
declared outright, without an illusory contract mask. 
Prosser, The Assault, supra note 66, at 1134. 
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment b (1965); 41 A.L.I. PROC. 
349-75 (1964) (A.L.I. debate over proposed § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
86. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (holding manufacturer of defective 
power tool strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by the defect). 
87. See, e.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); Suvada v. 
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619-20, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman 
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963). 
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Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, tort law generally regulates 
forced exchanges of entitlements. 88 Accidents are good examples. If 
an accidental injury occurs, and the injurer is adjudged liable, the in-
jurer must pay (and the victim must accept) an objectively determined 
measure of damages. 89 Because subjective values are not taken into 
account, forced exchanges may not be efficient: both parties may end 
up worse off than before the accident.90 In the paradigm case, it is 
impossible to rely on voluntary exchanges to reach an optimal result 
because the identities of the victim and the injurer are unknown until 
the accident occurs.91 
In some cases the identities of potential injurers and potential vic-
tims are known. Depending on the circumstances, voluntary ex-
changes enforced by contract rules may lead to more efficient results. 
For example, while it seems inconceivable for drivers and pedestrians 
to bargain over the risk of traffic accidents, it may be feasible for coal 
miners and mine owners to bargain over wages that reflect the risk of 
mine accidents. 92 The typical products liability situation presents an-
other instance in which bargaining is feasible, because the potential 
injurer (the seller) and the potential victim (the buyer) are known.93 
When the buyer and the seller actually do bargain over the risk of 
injury due to a potentially defective product, the argument for apply-
ing contract rules is strongest. 
Even if the buyer and seller expressly bargain over the risk of de-
fects, the bargain may not be enforced because of overriding social 
policies. 94 The terms of a bargain may be set aside either because lim-
88. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and lnalie11ability: 
011e View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
89. Id. at 1092. 
90. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88; Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351, 351-63 (1978); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory 
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REv. 341, 375-376 (1984); cf. Note, Beyond the Eye of the 
Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973) (arguing that aesthetic val-
ues can be objectively measured). 
91. A voluntary exchange would require that a bargain be struck between potential injurers 
and potential victims before the accident. Unless the potential injurers and potential victims 
already have a bargaining relationship, the transaction costs involved in this kind of pre-accident 
negotiation are likely to be prohibitive. G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS 90 (1970); 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88, at 1108-09. 
92. G. CALABRESI, supra note 91, at 90-91. 
93. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88, at 1109 n.38. 
94. See id. The policy justifications for holding a seller strictly liable in tort are summarized 
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment c (1965): 
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his 
product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to· 
ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the 
right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to 
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy 
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump· 
tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against 
which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled 
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iting the buyer to contract remedies would be unfair or because there 
was some defect in the bargaining process that prevented the parties 
from reaching an efficiency-enhancing result. 
The fairness rationale is essentially comprised of the following four 
arguments. First, sellers convey to the public a general sense of prod-
uct quality in their advertising and marketing practices, causing buy-
ers to rely on them for their skill and expertise.95 Second, sellers are 
often in a better position than buyers to identify potential product 
risks, to determine acceptable levels of such risks, and to confine the 
risks within those levels.96 Third, most product accidents not caused 
by product abuse are probably attributable to the seller's negligence at 
some stage of the manufacturing or marketing process.97 Fourth, sell-
ers are almost invariably in a better position to absorb or spread the 
costs of product accidents.98 
The efficiency rationale typically is advanced by one of the follow-
ing arguments. First, buyers are unable to protect themselves because 
of insufficient information, lack of bargaining power; or lack of 
choice.99 Second, the costs of injuries flowing from defective products 
to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it 
are those who market the products. 
See generally W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 
205-23 (1980); Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 V AND. L. REv. 681, 
703-14 (1980). One court described the development of strict tort liability as a response to 
the lack of contractual privity between manufacturer and ultimate user ... ; the relatively 
unequal strengths of buyer and seller at the bargaining table ... ; the difficulty faced by a 
consumer in proving negligence on the part of the manufacturer where the consumer· is 
several steps down the distribution chain and the evidence of negligent production is exclu-
sively within the control of the manufacturer ... ; [and] the ability of the manufacturer to 
distribute the risk of loss among all its purchasers .... 
General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(citations omitted) (denying a tort cause of action against the seller of an allegedly defective 
nuclear reactor). 
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c, supra note 94; see also w. 
KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 211; Owen, supra note 94, at 707-09. 
96. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 91, at 90-91; w. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, 
supra note 94, at 211; Owen, supra note 94, at 711-13. 
97. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 212; Owen, supra note 
94, at 710-11; see also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) (sale of 
defective and unreasonably dangerous product constitutes, assuming all the elements are proved, 
negligence per se); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the 
UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123, 134-35 (1974) (negligence per se 
and res ipsa /oquitur doctrines can be applied to reach the same results as strict tort liability). 
98. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 212; Owen, supra note 
94, at 710-11; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment c (1965) ("[P]ublic 
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products ... be treated as a cost 
of production against which liability insurance can be obtained .... "). 
99. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697, 701 (1963) ("The purpose of [strict tort] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries result-
ing from defective products are borne by the manufacturers ... rather than by the injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves."); G. CALABRESI, supra note 91, at 90-91; W. 
KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 211. But see A. SCHWARTZ & R. 
SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 191 n.10 (1982) (bargaining power explanation fails to 
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can fairly be put on the enterprises marketing those products as a cost 
of doing business, thus assuring that these businesses will fully "pay 
their own way" in the society from which they derive their profits. 100 
Finally, strict liability is needed to induce sellers to market safe 
products.101 
The expansion of the judicially developed tort theory has brought 
it into conflict with the more restrictive warranty provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. While some have argued that the area of 
products liability was preempted by legislative enactment of the Code, 
this view has not prevailed.102 Thus, in most states there are two po-
tential remedies for the same wrong. In cases such as Pennsylvania 
Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 a commercial buyer in privity 
with its seller can escape the limitations on its warranty104 by framing 
its cause of action in terms of strict tort liability. The following Part 
assesses whether allowing recourse to tort law under these circum-
stances can be justified in terms of the rationales for using strict liabil-
ity to supplant the Code. 
III. CHOOSING A RULE TO ACCOMMODATE THE POLICIES OF 
TORT LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The tension between the policies of tort law and the Code develops 
because the function of the product is at the core of the parties' bar-
gain.105 Thus, the harm sustained by the defective product itself rep-
resents a loss of the buyer's bargain. This type of harm is specifically 
account for the great similarity between written sales warranties in consumer and business 
markets). 
100. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965); w. KEETON, D. 
OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 90, at 14. 
101. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 212; Owen, supra note 
94, at 709-10. 
102. But see note 4 supra; see also Wade, supra note 3, at 3 nn. 8 & 11. See generally Wade, 
supra note 97. 
The preemption issue will take a somewhat different form if a federal products liability bill is 
passed. The provisions of that bill "[supersede] any state law regarding matters governed by 
[the] Act," thus apparently preempting both strict liability and liability for breach of warranty 
under the U.C.C. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)-(c) (1983); see also Walters, Federal Pre-
emption of State Products Liability Laws and Limitations of the Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 
32 DRAKE L. REV. 961 (1983); Note, The Products Liability Crisis: A Federal Statutory Solution, 
1983 ILL. L. REV. 757. 
103. 496 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1980), ajfd., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussed at 
notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text). 
104. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1176 (3d Cir. 
1981); notes 55-59 supra. In Pennsylvania Glass Sand, the warranty limited the seller's liability 
to the replacement of defective parts and specifically excluded recovery for economic loss. 652 
F.2d at 1167. The breach of warranty claim was also barred by the Code's statute oflimitations, 
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978), because the warranty did not explicitly extend to future performance. See 
496 F. Supp. at 716; note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
105. See Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[T]hc 
performance of the product - whether it explodes or fails to function - is conceptualized as 
part of the bargain .... "); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 96, 435 
December 1985] Note - Tort Recovery for Self-Inflicted Damage 533 
addressed by the Uniform Commercial Code.106 However, if buyers 
can characterize this harm as "property damage," they can avoid the 
warranty scheme of the Code - especially the warranty defenses 
available to the sellers107 - by suing in tort. 108 
There is some question as to whether strict liability remedies ought 
ever to be available to commercial buyers. Some courts have extended 
strict liability beyond consumer plaintiffs, 109 even though a commer-
cial buyer is as likely to be able to absorb the loss or to spread it 
among its customers as the seller.110 Similarly, commercial buyers 
and sellers are likely to be equally aware of the risks they are under-
taking and to bargain effectively for a contractual remedy. 111 At-
tempts by commercial buyers to exploit the property damage 
exception to the economic loss rule accentuate the anomaly of includ-
ing commercial buyers in the strict tort liability scheme.112 
N.E.2d 443, 455 (1982) (Simon, J., specially concurring) ("The product's function is at the core 
of the commercial bargain .•.. "). 
106. See U.C.C. §§ 1-106(1), 2-714, 2-715 (1978); note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
107. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text. 
108. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965) states: 
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or 
those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations 
on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitations to "buyer'' and "seller" in those 
statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a 
reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of 
action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he 
acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it 
be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the prod-
uct into the consumer's hands. 
109. See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 
1974); Sterno Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974); ICI Austl. Ltd. v. 
Elliott Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982). But see Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. 
United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979), Southwest Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse 
Blee. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Avenell v. Westinghouse 
Blee. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974). 
110. Some courts have grounded their adoption of strict liability on the manufacturer's supe-
rior ability (in relation to the consumer plaintiff) to spread the costs of accidents. See, e.g., 
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965); see also Seely v. 
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 24, 403 P.2d 143, 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 27 (1965)(Peters, J., 
concurring and dissenting). When a commercial buyer is involved, however, it is not necessarily 
true that the seller is better able to spread the risks. See Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United 
Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1979); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Blee. 
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976); Note, Disclaimers of Warranty 
in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 327-28 (1963). 
111. See Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd., 771 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985); General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842, 
844 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
112. This view of strict liability is not universally accepted: 
The applicability of a tort theory depends not upon the size of the plaintiff, but upon the 
nature of the claim. The very attempt to distinguish tort rights on the basis of economic 
strength would raise collateral issues ...• An actor has no more privilege to inflict injury on 
the wealthy than on the poor. The same rules apply to all, plaintiff or defendant, large or 
small .... [T]he doctrine of strict tort liability is not limited to "ordinary consumers." 
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Blee. Corp., 143 Ariz. 
368, 382, 694 P.2d 198, 212 (1984). 
534 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:S17 
Even assuming, however, that strict liability remedies should 
sometimes be made available to commercial buyers, 113 the contractual 
scheme set out in the Uniform Commercial Code is better suited for 
governing relations between commercial parties who are in privity. 
Allowing commercial buyers to sue their immediate sellers on a strict 
tort liability theory effectively overrides the parties' contractual alloca-
tion of risk. The tort remedy directly vitiates the effectiveness of sec-
tion 2-316 of the Code, which allows warranties to be disclaimed, 114 
and section 2-725 of the Code, which establishes a four-year statute of 
limitations.115 More broadly, it impairs the general Code policies of 
uniformity and certainty in commercial transactions. 116 
Leaving commercial buyers to their remedies under the Code by 
no means assures harsh results, because the Code - which was devel-
oped before strict liability emerged - affords a buyer considerable 
protection.117 The Code creates implied warranties118 and requires ba-
sically that disclaimers be in writing, conspicuous, and consistent with 
express warranties. 119 A court can refuse to enforce oppressive war-
ranty terms against a buyer on unconscionability grounds. 120 A court 
113. Affording a commercial buyer a cause of action based on strict tort liability against a 
remote manufacturer may be justifiable if the manufacturer's disclaimer or limitation on warran-
ties is held to be effective against an ultimate purchaser who did not have the opportunity to 
negotiate over the terms of the agreement. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (1978). This is still an 
unresolved issue. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 409; see also Spring Motors 
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. SSS, S82, 489 A.2d 660, 674 (198S) (reserving determi-
nation on the operation of U.C.C. remedies against remote parties, but holding strict liability 
action inapplicable against remote manufacturer). 
114. See notes SS-S6 supra and accompanying text. 
115. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text. 
116. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. For example, consider James v. Bell Helicop-
ter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983), an action brought by a Utah buyer against a Texas seller 
and an Illinois clutch manufacturer. Applying Texas law, the court affirmed dismissal of the tort 
claim against the seller. Applying Illinois law, the court reversed dismissal of the tort claim 
against the clutch manufacturer. See also Wade, supra note 3, at 27: 
The law in one state may adversely affect all three parties to a personal injury case -
manufacturer, insurer, and injured party - in other states. The manufacturer's products 
may be distributed in many states, even nationwide. He must give due consideration to the 
liability law of all the states where he distributes, and this may affect the nature and cost of 
his products. The insurance companies are not accustomed to calculating insurance rates 
according to the actuarial experiences in the individual states. If a state in the northeast or 
on the west coast develops a rule that is unusually favorable to the injured party, insurance 
rates and product costs may both rise in other states without any corresponding benefit to 
the consumer. One of the ironies of the legislative splurge to put restrictions and limitations 
on liability actions to relieve the products liability crisis was that such an act in a particular 
case lessened the protection for the local consumer without affording any actual relief to the 
local manufacturer. 
117. See notes 119-22 infra; see also Wade, supra note 97, at 132-36 (contending that a provi· 
sion similar to § 402A had been dropped from the U.C.C. in favor of§ 2-318, which extends 
sales warranties to certain third parties). 
118. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978). The federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, lS U.S.C. 
§§ 2301-2312 (1982), also applies in the case of consumer goods. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
supra note 7, at 367-74. 
120. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); see also Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 
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can also grant relief if it finds that circumstances cause an exclusive 
remedy to "fail of its essential purpose."121 In addition, the Code im-
poses a general obligation to deal in good faith. 122 Finally, the Code 
defenses, such as a failure to give notice of breach, are considerably 
less onerous for a buyer who has had previous dealings with the 
seller. 123 
At the same time, the policies that justify strict liability have con-
siderably less force when a commercial buyer is suing an immediate 
seller for the value of the product. When the buyer and seller are in 
privity, there is no difficulty in identifying the potential victims and 
the potential injurer. This significantly reduces the transaction costs 
of allocating the risk of defects by contract.124 Of course, sellers will 
sometimes be in a better position than buyers to minimize the risks of 
product defects. However, informed buyers will at other times have a 
comparative advantage over sellers in minimizing the risks posed by 
those defects. 125 The parties and society as a whole will be better off if 
(S.D. Ind. 1984) ("The fact that courts are reluctant to invoke these [unconscionability] provi-
sions does not justify the application of tort theory to resolve a problem of sales law."), a.ffd., 771 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 335, 581 P.2d 
784, 793 (1978) ("[T]he UCC provisions provide this Court with ample room for the exercise of 
wide judicial discretion to ensure that substantial justice results in particular cases."); Monsanto 
Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 262, 326 A.2d 90, 99 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) 
("[A] hearing must be held as to the contract's commercial setting, purpose and effect, in order to 
aid the court in determining whether the clause is unconscionable under the circumstances."); 
Lobianco v. Property Protection Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 369, 437 A.2d 417, 429 (1983) (Mont-
gomery, J., dissenting) ("[U.C.C. § 2-302] appears to permit the exercise of broad discretion by a 
court in determination of whether a clause may be unconscionable in the circumstances of any 
particular case."); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (making certain warranty limitations unconscionable). But 
see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 145, 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1310 
(1980) (the reluctance of courts to invoke good faith and unconscionability clauses and the devel-
opment of strict tort liability is testimony to the inadequacies of the U.C.C.), revd. in part, 91 Ill. 
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 475-76 (U.C.C. § 2-316 
may preempt the unconscionability doctrine in commercial disclaimer cases). 
121. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978); see, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 
F.2d 974, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) (limited remedy of equipment repair fails of essential purpose 
where equipment totally destroyed). Ironically, the paradigm "failure of essential purpose" case 
is one in which a product is damaged beyond repair as the result of its own defects and its 
warranty is limited to repair or replacement of defective parts. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
supra note 7, at 465-71. Thus recourse to a strict tort liability claim in this context is critical only 
to a buyer who must circumvent the Code's statute of limitations, U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978), to 
recover. 
122. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); see Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. 
Ind. 1984) (dicta) (reluctance of courts to invoke "good faith" provision does not justify applica-
tion of tort theory to resolve a sales law problem). 
123. See note 81 supra. 
124. See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text. 
125. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr, supra note 99, at 190; see also Calabresi, Optimal 
Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657 (1975) (if there is no liability without negli-
gence, optimal deterrence will be achieved only if the victim class always can (1) best decide 
whether accident avoidance is worthwhile; and (2) best accomplish such worthwhile avoidance); 
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-61 (1972) 
(liability should be imposed on the party relatively more likely to find out whether accident 
avoidance is worth it - the cheapest cost avoider). 
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the buyer and seller are allowed to allocate risks consistent with their 
respective advantages.126 These potential gains are forgone if a risk 
allocation is imposed by law. 
Thus, the fairness and efficiency rationales for strict liability are 
not compelling in the commercial context. Because social wealth may 
increase if the parties are permitted to allocate the risks of product 
defects by contract, the efficiency rationale127 is substantially weak-
ened. Because the buyer is protected to a considerable extent by the 
Code, the fairness rationale128 is also weakened. Nevertheless, several 
justifications have been advanced for permitting a commercial buyer 
to recover for a product's self-inflicted damage in spite of limitations 
on the seller's liability contained in an express warranty or in the 
Code. 
One common justification for allowing commercial buyers to re-
cover the value of defective products in tort is the need to deter manu-
facturers from producing unreasonably dangerous products. If 
manufacturers are held strictly liable for defective products, the argu-
ment goes, they will produce safer products. Safe products, the argu-
ment continues, should not be something the parties are forced to 
bargain over; unreasonably dangerous products should simply not be 
produced.129 Strict tort liability is thus extended to commercial buy-
ers on the social policy grounds of improving safety generally.130 
This justification suffers from a logical difficulty in the strict tort 
liability context. Once we know a product is "bad," i.e., unreasonably 
dangerous, it makes sense to deter its manufacturer from producing 
it. 131 But the deterrence argument contributes nothing to deciding 
what type and degree of residual danger makes a product "bad" in the 
first place. It offers no basis for distinguishing an unreasonably dan-
gerous product from one that entails reasonable risks.132 
This failure of the deterrence justification to distinguish unreasona-
bly dangerous products from those that entail an acceptable level of 
risk is especially problematic in the commercial context. Imposing 
strict liability based on a deterrence rationale will tend to discourage 
126. See note 61 supra; note 141 infra. 
127. See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text; see also Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan 
Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 180 (Gee, J., dissenting) ("[A]llowing the plaintiff 
..• to prosecute its tort cause of action is highly unfair to the defendant ... [where the parties are 
in a contractual relationship]."). 
129. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpittar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 
1175 (3d Cir. 1981); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 381, 694 P.2d 198, 211 (1984). 
130. See Note, Contract or Tort, supra note 3 at 509-10. 
131. But see Henderson, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of 
Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1983) (real-world phenomena inhibit the etrect of 
court-created incentives to produce safer products). 
132. Owen, supra note 94, at 709-10. 
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the sale of all products that pose any significant danger. 133 When 
commercial parties with comparable bargaining power and access to 
information negotiate a warranty concerning a potentially dangerous 
product, they presumably have made their own judgment about the 
risks and potential benefits associated with the product, with the buyer 
concluding that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.134 
It is precisely this type of bargain that the Uniform Commercial Code 
is designed to protect.135 Strict tort liability effectively overrides the 
parties' judgment and undermines Code policies. 
Further, it is economically inefficient to negate the terms of the 
parties' bargain unless there is some reason (excluding hindsight) to 
believe that a court is better equipped to weigh product risks and bene-
fits.136 A general refusal to enforce contract terms leads to more effi-
cient results only if buyers systematically and persistently 
underestimate product risks.137 In the commercial context, any errors 
by the buyer in estimating product risks are likely to be random, and 
buyers are likely to know the terms of their contracts and the range of 
market alternatives. Thus, the imposition of strict tort liability in the 
commercial setting is likely to lead to a less than optimal allocation of 
risk. 
Another common justification for strict tort liability is that manu-
facturers should always bear the cost of accidents caused by their de-
fective products, either because manufacturers are better able to 
minimize product defects or better able to spread the cost of injuries 
among their buyers. 138 In cases involving commercial entities, how-
ever, the assumptions on which this rationale is founded may be fun-
damentally incorrect. As a matter of economic efficiency, allocating 
133. See Owen, supra note 94, at 709; Sachs, Negligence or Strict Products Liability: Is There 
Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 259, 274-76 (1978); see also 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 30, at VI-47; w. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 54-
55; Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1087-92 (1965); 
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Weinstein, Twerski, 
Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 
425, 430-33 (1974). 
134. Cf note 141 infra. 
135. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text. 
136. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Ex-
amples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1457-58 (1983). A general ban 
on the enforcement of warranty terms is only appropriate for transactions involving frequently 
purchased, inexpensive items, which malfunction so as to cause personal injury a very low per-
centage of the time. Strict tort liability is one means of implementing such a general ban. Id. at 
1458-59 & nn.120-21. The standard example is the exploding soda bottle. Cf Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
137. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 136, at 1458-59. Although the authors focus on 
consumer warranties, their analysis can be applied to the commercial setting as well. See id. at 
1416 & n.53. 
138. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 
1172-73 (3d Cir. 1981); see also notes 96 & 98 supra and accompanying text. 
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the risk of all product defects to sellers by law may prevent the parties 
from taking advantage of the buyer's superior ability to avoid certain 
risks. 139 It seems likely that there will be at least some product risks 
that the buyer, rather than the seller, will be able to avoid more 
cheaply or insure against more readily. 140 Moreover, substituting a 
legal allocation of risks for one that may have been bargained for by 
the parties141 is at odds with the Code's policy of allowing parties to 
negotiate their own contracts.142 Indeed, strict liability creates sub-
stantial information demands on the legal system by requiring courts 
to formulate their own complex risk allocation judgments. 143 
When a product is damaged as a result of its own defects, commer-
cial buyers144 in privity with the defendant should be left to the reme-
139. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scarr, supra note 99, at 191-96; Calabresi, supra note 125, at 
657; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 125, at 1058; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 35 J, 
LAW & EcoN. l, 3 (1960); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J, LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 
(1973). 
140. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scarr, supra note 99, at 191·96; Calabresi, supra note 125, at 
657; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 125, at 1058. 
141. See note 61 supra; Posner, supra note 139, at 208: 
Regardless of liability, the seller will have an incentive to adopt any cost-justified precau-
tion, because, by lowering the total cost ofthe product to the buyer, it will enable the seller 
to increase his profit. Where, however, the buyer can prevent the accident at lower cost 
than the seller, the buyer can be counted on to take the precaution rather than the seller, for 
by doing so the buyer will minimize the sum of the price of the product (which will include 
the cost of any precautions taken by the seller) and the expected accident cost. 
(footnotes omitted). Posner uses the following example: 
Suppose the price of a product is $10 and the expected accident cost 10¢; then the total cost 
to the (risk-neutral) consumer is $10.10. If the producer can reduce the expected accident 
cost to 5¢-say at a cost of3¢ to himself-then he can increase the price of the product to 
$10.05, since the cost to the (risk-neutral) consumer remains the same. Thus his profit per 
unit is increased by 2¢. 
Id., at 208 n.7. 
142. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text. 
143. The problem is that it takes a lot of information to decide what degree of risk is "unrea-
sonable." See generally W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 491-506; 
see also Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 125, at 1060; Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J, 
LEGAL STUD. 151, 169-70 (1973); Posner, supra note 139, at 211-12. 
144. Limiting the privity approach to commercial buyers is necessary in light of the eco-
nomic rationales put forward for that approach. However, the underlying distinction between 
commercial buyers and consumers is problematic. Although some courts have relied heavily 
upon the plaintiff's character as a commercial buyer, see, e.g., Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Trac-
tors, 582 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 
N.J. 555, 574-77, 489 A.2d 660, 670-71 (1985), small commercial buyers occasionally find them-
selves in need of the same protections afforded to consumers. Courts employing the commercial/ 
consumer distinction have shown a willingness to manipulate the definition of "consumer" to 
encompass these cases. E.g., Sterno Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 
1974); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 III. App. 3d 136, 144, 414 N.E.2d 1302, 
1309 (1980), revd. in part, 91 III. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J. Super. 22, 40-41, 465 A.2d 530, 541 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), revd., 
98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985); see also ICI Aust!. Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 
265 (D.N.J. 1982) (commercial purchaser may recover in strict liability action). The analysis of 
Judge Peters in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 27-28, 403 P.2d 145, 157-58, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 17, 29-30 (1963) (Peters, J., concurring in judgment), is typical of these cases: 
Although this is a.close case, I would find that plaintiff was an ordinary consumer inso-
far as the purchase involved here was concerned, even though he bought the truck for use in 
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dies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. Strict tort liability 
should apply only when the buyer and seller are not in privity. The 
privity limitation makes sense when only the defective product itself is 
damaged, because in these situations the affected parties have allocated 
the risk of product defects by contract. Such bargaining between ra-
tional decisionmakers will tend to produce efficient results. 145 When 
there is some reason to suspect that the bargaining process has been 
unfair or has led to inefficient results, Code provisions are available to 
grant relief on a case-by-case basis. 146 
The privity limitation is consistent with the policies underlying 
strict liability when a product is damaged because it does not preclude 
a tort recovery by third parties who would otherwise be forced to bear 
the external costs of the transaction. The privity limitation is consis-
tent with Code policy in this context because it promotes certainty and 
stability in commercial transactions. Finally, the privity limitation is a 
common law doctrine that can be applied far more easily than can 
rules requiring judicial appraisal of the nature of the defect, the type of 
risk, and the manner in which the injury arose.141 
CONCLUSION 
When a commercial buyer is in privity with its seller, recovery for 
the value of a defective product should be controlled by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. If the damage is to the product itself and the par-
ties have allocated the risk of defects contractually, allowing a strict 
liability action unfairly allows commercial buyers to escape the conse-
quences of their bargain.148 Even in the absence of bargaining over 
risks, strict liability is economically inefficient because it introduces an 
element of uncertainty into commercial transactions, thereby increas-
ing transaction costs and creating incentives to overinvest in safety. 
Strict liability frustrates Code policies by interfering with the ability of 
parties to allocate resources between them as they see fit. Finally, it is 
his business. Plaintiff was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for hauling and not a 
fleet-owner who bought trucks regularly in the course of his business. He was the final link 
in the marketing chain, having no more bargaining power than does the usual individual 
who purchases a motor vehicle on the retail level. 
I recognize that this "ordinary consumer" test needs judicial definition. This should be 
done on a case-by-case basis as is customarily done with any new doctrine. It is, however, 
the best resolution of the dilemma facing this court. 
Although the distinction is currently unstable, the "commercial buyer" limitation should nor-
maUy have little effect on results, for ordinary consumers are unlikely to be in privity with 
manufacturers. 
145. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 136, at 1458-59; notes 120-22 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
147. See notes 25-39 supra and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 984 (6th Cir. 
1984) ("[W]e do not believe that a sophisticated, commercial buyer like Rudd can evade contrac-
tual language excluding liability ... simply by suing the seUer in tort."). 
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unnecessary because commercial buyers can protect themselves 
contractually.149 
- Mark A. Kaprelian 
149. Probably the most common situation in which a commercial buyer sues a seller on a 
strict tort liability theory is where the Code's four-year statute of limitations, U.C.C. § 2-725 
(1978), has expired. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 
(3d Cir. 1981); Cinnaminson Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 
1982); ICI Austl. Ltd. v. Elliot Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982); Largoza v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 
Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 
N.E.2d 443 (1982); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J. Super. 22, 465 
A.2d 530 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), revd., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). This problem 
can be avoided by negotiating a warranty that "explicitly extends to future performance." 
U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978); see note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
A commercial buyer could also assert that the circumstances caused an exclusive or limited 
remedy to "fail of its essential purpose." U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978); see J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 7, at 465-71; note 121 supra and accompanying text. A commercial buyer 
could also conceivably allege unconscionability if it has agreed to a limited warranty. See note 
120 supra and accompanying text. 
